Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series

April 07, 2017

Imsi-Catcher Detection For Mobile Operating
Systems
Tanmay Wadhwa
Neil Dhillon

Follow this and additional works at: http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
Recommended Citation
Wadhwa, Tanmay and Dhillon, Neil, "Imsi-Catcher Detection For Mobile Operating Systems", Technical Disclosure Commons, (April
07, 2017)
http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/462

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Defensive Publications
Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

Wadhwa and Dhillon: Imsi-Catcher Detection For Mobile Operating Systems

IMSI-CATCHER DETECTION FOR MOBILE OPERATING SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
Systems and methods for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSIcatcher are disclosed. The system includes a mobile device installed with an application that
collects signal data and wirelessly transmits the data to a server. The application may be part of
a remote attestation service and communicates directly with radio interface layer (RIL) to
collect telephony network and diagnostic information data from the device’s baseband. The
collected data is sent to the server for remote attestation. The method includes detecting
anomalies in the signal data from crowd-sourced heuristics and notifying the device user
discreetly of the presence of an IMSI-catcher. The system and method provide identification of
IMSI catchers with high reliability since the detection is done using crowd-sourced data from
many devices and on the server-side, it’s more difficult for an attacker to conceal being
identified and to counter the detection.
BACKGROUND
Government agencies and other malicious actors currently use a device known as an
IMSI-catcher to infringe on a mobile phone user’s privacy by eavesdropping on
telecommunications and tracking their locations. Furthermore, law-enforcement agencies in the
United States are permitted to use IMSI-catchers without a search warrant. These devices are
used to perform a man-in-the-middle attack by acting as a “fake” mobile tower between the user
and the cellular carrier’s actual mobile phone tower. These devices exploit vulnerability in the
GSM standard whereby subscribers are required to authenticate to base stations, however base
stations are not required to reciprocally authenticate to subscribers. IMSI-catchers force nearby
subscribers to fall back to using the unencrypted A5/0 mode or the weakly encrypted A5/1 and
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A5/2 modes for voice calls and SMS. Since SMS is often used for second-factor authentication,
this vulnerability can also be used to assist in hijacking user accounts.
IMSI-catchers can only operate under specific conditions, such as physical proximity to
the targeted subscriber, higher signal strength than neighboring base stations and a call or SMS
to be placed or received by the targeted subscriber. There are several IMSI-catcher detection
applications available for use in various mobile operating systems. These applications are
severely limited by the capabilities available on the operating system’s application layer APIs,
especially to radio and telephony interfaces. As a result, many of these applications require
superuser privileges on a device in order to function.
DESCRIPTION
Systems and methods for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSIcatcher are disclosed. The system is depicted in FIG. 1 and includes a mobile device installed
with an application in wireless communication with a server. The server includes a framework
which detects anomalies in the cellular connectivity data and notifies the user discreetly. The
mobile device may be running on any mobile operating system. The application may be part of
a remote attestation service and communicates directly with radio interface layer (RIL) to
collect telephony network and diagnostic information data from the device’s baseband. The
collected data is compressed and sent to the server for remote attestation. The server includes a
framework for crowd-sourced heuristics or machine learning classifier to detect anomalies. The
crowd-sourced heuristics can include factors such as signal strength of other devices connected
to the geolocated cell tower, mode of telephony, and if the account associated with device is
being targeted by malicious actors, etc.
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FIG. 1: System for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSI-catcher
The method as depicted in FIG. 2 includes collecting telephony network and diagnostic
information from the device’s baseband by communicating directly with the radio interface
layer (RIL) and sending compressed data packets to the server for remote attestation. The
server decompresses the data and applies crowd-based heuristics or machine learning classifiers
to detect anomalies and generates a score. If the score is above a certain threshold, the server
notifies the user of the mobile device through discreet means, such as a predetermined
notification, symbol or behavior to be displayed across devices. For instance, the notification or
symbol may be an exclamation mark over the cellular status symbol on the top bar, or a text
message informing the user that the calls and SMS may be eavesdropped on the cellular
connectivity status indicator.
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FIG. 2: A method for detecting and notifying a mobile device user of an IMSI-catcher
In one instance, when the user receives an incoming or places an outgoing call, the
dialer displays bright red text explicitly notifying the user that traffic may currently be
eavesdropped. Additionally, during the call a persistent notification may be presented
informing the user that the presence of an IMSI-catcher has been discovered. If the user taps on
the notification or cellular connectivity quick-tile, he/she will be presented with the option to
disable cellular connectivity until the connection is safe.
The disclosed system and method allows for crowd-sourced information to be used in
detection as opposed to user data. Solving this problem at the platform level automatically
bootstraps the data collection efforts from thousands of individual devices, as it is currently
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done using application based IMSI-detectors, to hundreds of millions of devices distributed
globally and all contributing crowd-based information. Since the identification is done using a
server-side component, more CPU resources along with the additional data allows for more
sophisticated and up-to-date detection of IMSI-catchers.
The systems and methods have several advantages over application-level solutions.
First, superuser privileges are not needed since the system is capable of collecting diagnostic
telephony information from the baseband using without compromising the security model of
the device. Second, the sources of data collected can more easily be updated at the system-level
as opposed to the application-level especially since the user does need to grant additional
permissions. This will provide additional privacy for users who are not aware of the
vulnerability. Third, since detection is done server-side, heuristics can more easily be updated
without requiring an update to the device. This not only improves the speed of updates, but also
makes it more difficult for attackers to counter improvements made in the crowd-sourced
detection and for an attacker to conceal being identified. Bulk data collection and server-side
analysis of diagnostic information will make it harder for attackers to determine which signals
are used in detecting IMSI-catchers. Lastly, solving this problem at the system-level will allow
users to be notified using familiar and consistent methods just like all other security and
privacy protections built into the operating system.
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